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I. INTRODUCTION
NTEREST-FREE loans to related individuals may offer new hope in
man's eternal quest to avoid the onerous taxes imposed by all
forms of government. The elaborate dance ritual in which tax
collector and taxpayer engage often resembles the native Caribbean
dance of "limbo," with the tax collector continually striving to lower
the pole and the taxpayer struggling to devise ingenious new contor-
tions that will allow him to slip under it. The tax attorney's role in
this scenario is to determine for taxpayer just "how low you can go. "'
Thanks to the Tax Court's recent decision in Crown v. Commis-
sioner,' which is a reaffirmation of the earlier district court decision
in Johnson v. United States,3 this limbo contest may have just com-
menced. Under the gift and estate tax rules in effect prior to 1977, an
estate plan might have called for inter-vivos transfers designed to take
advantage of the lower gift tax rates and the dual taxing mechanism
whereby inter-vivos transfers and testamentary transfers were subject
"'Low" is in no way intended to suggest deviousness or illegality; I merely draw the
analogy between a quaint native dance and the taxpayer's quaint game of tax
avoidance, both of which are perfectly legal. See 240 U.S. at 630-31, infra note 8.
267 T.C. 1060 (1977). [Editor's note. While this article was being edited, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Crown v. Com-
missioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978). The Internal Revenue Service announced its
nonacquiescence in the decision. 1978-22 I.R.B. 6.]
1254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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to two different and separate sets of rates. The objective of the new
limbo contest will be avoidance of the 1976 Tax Reform Act's unitax
rate structure, which causes gifts and testamentary transfers to be
similarly taxed, assuming the same value of the transferred property.
4
Besides possibly postponing the grasp of the unitax, s the real objec-
tive of the dance may be avoiding the income tax ramifications,
which are just as important to a taxpayer (although it should be noted
that income tax law has no operative effect on gift tax law).' There
are, in reality, two areas of taxation being dealt with under this
topic-gift tax and income tax.'
II. THE TERMINOLOGY CONFRONTED
A. What is Tax Avoidance?
Tax evasion amounts to an escape from tax by illegal means; tax
avoidance is an escape from tax by legal means, namely by a reduc-
tion of the taxable income. The distinction was drawn by Justice
Holmes:
We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a case
is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse
legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law per-
mits. When the act is condemned as an evasion, what is meant is that
it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the
mere letter of the law.' (Emphasis added).
If the operation of tax laws is merely burdensome on the taxpayer,
the courts will afford no relief.9 On the other hand, taxing statutes
may not be extended beyond the clear import of the language used.'"
The principle has often been stated that a taxpayer has a right to
decrease his taxes by reduction of his tax base if the transaction is
real. "
'I.R.C. § 2001.
'Guy B. Maxfield, Tax Reform Act Special Supplement, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 5 (Stephens, Maxfield & Lind, 1965). In addition, the 1976 Tax Reform Act
changed I.R.C. § 2035 to provide that gifts made within three years of the date of death
are automatically included in the decedent's gross estate without a contemplation
assumption. Section 2035(c) further provides that the inter-vivos transfer tax paid will
be included in the gross estate under what is known as the "gross up" process.
'See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
'This article will be limited in scope to treating only interest-free loans among
related individuals.
'Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1916-.
'Burnet v. Standford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 365 (1931).
"McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 US. 102 (1935).
"R. B. Cowden, 9 T.C.M. 1148 (1950). See Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355
(1939) (authority for the principle that the particular transaction involved must be a
natural business transaction, and not "hocus-pocus").
[Vol. 1:113
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B. What is Property?
To start with a jurisprudential view, Roscoe Pound claimed:
In civilized society men must be able to assume that they may control,
for purposes beneficial to themselves, what they have discovered and
appropriated to their own use, what they have created by their own
labor and what they have acquired under existing social and economic
order.'2
Even though this may be a jural postulate of civilized society as we
know it, there are as many views as there are sections in the Internal
Revenue Code. The United States Supreme Court has gone so far as to
hold that a person's interest in governmental benefits is a "property
interest" and subject to procedural due process if the claim of "entitle-
ment" to the benefit is supported by the rules of the agency affording
the benefit.' 3 The Court, in a more recent case,' established that
"protected interests" in property are not ordinarily created by the
United States Constitution itself; but rather, the entitlements are
created, and their dimensions defined, by an independent source such
as a state's common law, statutes, or rules entitling an individual to
certain benefits.' s
The better definition of "property" vis-a-vis non-interest-bearing
loans may be found in an examination of the legislative history of Sec-
tion 501 of the Revenue Act of 1932.1" In commenting on that provi-
sion, the House Ways and Means Committee said:
The terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are used in
the broadest and most comprehensive sense; the term "property"
reaching every species of right or interest protected by law and having
an exchangeable value.
The words "transfer ... by gift" and "whether ... direct or in-
direct" are designed to cover and comprehend all transactions (subject
to certain express conditions and limitations) whereby and to the ex-
tent that property or a property right is donatively passed to or con-
ferred upon another, regardless of the means or the device employed in
its accomplishment."
The United States Supreme Court pointed out that the "language
of the gift tax statute, 'property ... real or personal, tangible or in-
"An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE & LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 79 (Cohen & Cohen ed. 1951).
"Perry v. Sniderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
4Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (197S).
"Id. at 572.
"Revenue Act of 1932, § 501. This section is the forerunner of I.R.C. § 2501. The
reason for more expanded discussion of "property" is to afford a better understanding
of what confronted the pro-taxpayer's court in Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp.
73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
"1H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1932). The comments of the Senate
Finance Committee were identical. See S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932).
1979]
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tangible,' is broad enough to include property, however conceptual or
contingent."'" Furthermore, it is well recognized in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that the right to the use of property is one of the most
valued rights inhering in ownership.'0 Money, therefore, is also con-
sidered property.
20
C. What is Interest?
One of the many beneficial uses available to an owner of money is
the legally enforceable right to demand and receive interest as a con-
dition of lending it to another. Interest, however, is not considered a
product of the common law, although virtually a matter of economic
necessity for industrialized nations.2 Interest has long been recog-
nized as a "necessary incident, the natural growth of
money .. "22
For tax purposes, interest has been defined by the Supreme Court
of the United States as the amount one has contracted to pay for the
use of borrowed money, and as the compensation paid for the use or
forbearance of money .... The [Tax Court] has stated that interest is
the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or
forebearance. . . of money.23
III. GIFT TAX ANALYSIS OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS
A. Federal District Court in Johnson v. United States
Johnson v. United States was a case of first impression on the issue
of possible gift-tax implication from the making of interest-free loans
to related borrowers."4 The essential facts reveal a taxpayer, over a
period of several years, transferring substantial amounts of money to
his adult son and daughter as loans that were repayable upon demand
and did not bear interest. The Commissioner assessed and collected
gift taxes on the theory that the taxpayer had made gifts to his
children of the use of the money loaned. The asserted deficiency for
the value of the gift was 31 percent of the average unpaid balance as
of the end of each taxable year . 21
"Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 174, 180 (1943).
"See e.g., BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 7-8, 389 (W. Lewis ed. 1897); see also Spann
v. Dallas, Ill Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
2'See, e.g., Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443 (1901). Interesting-
ly, the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 does usually hold that the term "property" embraces
money. See Rev. Rul. 69-357, 1969-1 C.B. 101; George M. Holstein, 23 T.C. 923, 924
(1955).
2
'Totten v. Totten, 294 1II. 70, 90, 128, N.E. 295, 303 (1920). By 1900, statutes of
all the states sanctioned the allowance of interest on loans. See Beach v. Peabody, 188
Ill. 75, 79, 58 N.E. 679, 680 (1900).
"
2 Woerz v. Schumacher, 37 App. Div. 374, 376, 56 N.Y.S. 8, 11 (1899).
"Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.
254 F. Supp. at 77.
"The tax years involved were 1959-1960, so Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958) was
used.
[Vol. 1:11:3
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From a legal purist's point of view, the case may be seen as a
gigantic wart on the face of gift tax jurisprudence. Even a law stu-
dent's exam technique of tracking the statute produces skepticism.
The Internal Revenue Code calls for an imposition of an excise tax2"
on the transfer 27 of property28 by gift.29
It becomes readily apparent that there might be deemed a "trans-
fer" of "property" in the case at hand. But one should also heed the
implications of the court's decision. First, the court found that the
children had repaid their demand loans."0 This fact removes any sug-
gestion of a mere sham transaction. Second, the "right to interest
must arise from an express or implied contractual obligation or from
statute."'" (Emphasis added), Since there was not any recognition of
interest at common law, the right to interest should not be considered
an automatic right, in the absence of contract or statute to the con-
trary.3
2
The court further reasoned that there was no express or statutory
duty on the part of the children to pay interest to their parents.33 Nor
was there an implied duty on the part of the children to pay interest
since the parties specifically intended that the demand loans were
non-interest bearing.34 The court said that "[t]he time has not come
when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's length with his children
when they ... start out in life.".3 "'Passage of a law providing for a tax
like the one here contended for should be sought through Congress in-
stead of the courts.- 36
"I.R.C. § 2501.
""Transfers" which come within the meaning of the term "gift" are expressly
described in I.R.C. § 251 1(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(a), (c) (1958).
"H. R. REP. No. 708, supra note 17.
""Gift" is not directly defined in the Code. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
construing the gift tax provisions, has repeatedly emphasized that Congress was not
concerned with refinements of title, but rather with the passage of control over
economic benefits of property having exchangeable value and for which full value was
not returned. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933). See also Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1945), which held that the evident desire of Congress in
enacting the federal gift tax was to encompass "all the protean arrangements which the
wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary
speech .. ." (Emphasis added).
"Hence, the transaction could be deemed real in a business sense. See 240 U.S. at
630-31 (1916).
11254 F. Supp. at 77.
"Interest is not part of a debt unless so stipulated in a contract. Grober v. Kohn, 88
N.J. Super. 343, 212 A.2d 384 (1965).
"254 F. Supp. at 77.
"Id. "There is no legal requirement, express or implied, to charge... [children] ...
interest on money advanced to them."
$5Id.
3"Id. With the Congress being vested with the almost plenary power to tax by the
United States Constitution, should not a court properly refuse to legislate judicially in a
nebulous area?
1979]
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What might appear to be a typical cop-out goes beyond that. The
court realized the many underlying issues involved. There was
realization that the "parents were under no duty to lend or otherwise
invest their money." 37 A person has a right to keep his cash in the pro-
verbial mattress if he wants to. The purpose of many federal tax laws
is to spur the economy by prudent investment, and even a rudimen-
tary conception of macroeconomics tells us that "investment" is one
of the important elements in developing an adequate supply curve,
which helps to stabilize prices. 38 Can there be a more sound invest-
ment than that in one's own children? In a free economy, private sav-
ings and investment have an important influence on economic
growth. Under private enterprise, "How fast can the economy
grow?" depends greatly on how much individuals save and reinvest.
3
1
The Internal Revenue Service's position may even be viewed as
counterproductive, since Congress has even permitted preferential in-
come tax rates to a person who is deemed a "Head of Household.-
4 0
This status has been continually expanded to include any individual
who provides a household for a lineal decedent, regardless of
dependency, and anyone else who provides a household in which the
taxpayer is entitled to a Section 151 deduction.4' From this over-
simplification, it may be concluded that Congress has directly en-
couraged "charity to commence at home." In the estate and gift tax
area, especially, Congress has shown explicit favoritism to intra-
family gratuities.42 In light of its reliance on the announcement by
the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue4 3 on the purpose of the gift tax, should anyone blame the
Court for its standoffish approach?
The Court there held that the enactment of gift taxes was to pre-
vent a person from evading estate taxes through reduction of his gross
estate by inter-vivos gifts.44 Here the court in Johnson v. United States
noted that the loans that had not been repaid were included in the
decedent's gross estate.4 5 The court was indirectly noting that family
3 1d.
I'M. Lee, MACROECONOMICS: FLUCTUATIONS, GROWTH. AND STABILITY 208-307 (3rd
ed. 1963).
3 Id
4"I.R.C. § l(b).
41Id. § 2(b) defines this term.
"Id., For example, § 2503 (b)'s annual $3,000 per donee exclusion. Section 2503(c)
even gives special treatment to transfers for the benefit of minors. Section 2513(a)(1)
permits the § 2503(b) exclusion to total up to $6,000 if the proper husband and wife
election is made. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 brought with it additional benefits: Sec-
tion 2507 was added to give preference to bequests made to orphans, and § 2613(b)(6)
permits a $250,000 exclusion for "generation skipping trusts" to grandchildren.
'3340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950).
44Id.
4'254 F. Supp. at 77.
[Vol. 1:113
INTEREST-FREE LOANS
members can deal at arm's length even though a transaction is
generally presumed to be one of gift and therefore subject to "special
scrutiny.""8 It has even been held that a loan to a family member is
presumed to be a gift.47 With the close analysis given to family tran-
sactions, a parent should have some freedom over the control of his
property. The strongest proof possible that a loan is genuine should
be the repayment of the principal. 8
B. The Internal Revenue Service's Position
Surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service did not appeal the
Johnson v. United States48 decision."0 As a matter of fact, the Internal
Revenue Service did not even nonacquiesce in the decision until it
published Revenue Ruling 73-61. s' In that ruling, the Service de-
nounced the decision in Johnson v. United States"2 and proclaimed
that they would adhere to the earlier Tax Court decision of Gertrude
H. Blackburn..3
The ruling states that the right to use property-in our case,
money-is described as an interest in property which results in a gift
when transferred without adequate consideration. s4 Consequently, a
46See, e.g., Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Commissioner v. Tower,
327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).
4"Estate of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds, 55 T. C. 172, 201 (1970). Frequently, the ques-
tion arises in the context of a bad debt deduction sought by the lender. Estate of Carr,
12 T.C. 1158 (1949). The courts often conclude that a gift rather than a loan was in-
tended. See, e.g., Elizabeth N. Rude, 48 T.C. 165, 172 (1967).
"See 254 F. Supp. 73, 76. "No demand was made by taxpayers of the debtors for
repayment, and the repayments ... were voluntary rather than forced payments."
"254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
"2 CCH 1966 FED. EST. & GiFT TAX REP. 9006.
"1Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. See also Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227 and
Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227. In these two earlier rulings, the Service concluded
that a gift is complete when the donor has parted with dominion and control over the
property so as to leave him no power to change its disposition, provided that the trans-
ferred interest in property is susceptible of valuation at that time. If the "donor" does
not receive any interest, the amount of the gift is the full amount of the interest at the
market rate applicable to that "borrower" in that location for that purpose.
2254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
s20 T.C. 204 (1953). There the court held that the taxpayer made a gift in the
transfer of real property to her children in exchange for a note bearing interest at a rate
of only 21/4 percent per annum when the market rate of interest for debt obligations
secured by real estate at the time was 4 percent per annum. The court held it was pro-
per for the Commissioner to discount the note from its lower rate of interest and to treat
the amount of the discount as a gift made by the taxpayer to her children. Interesting to
note, the Blackburn case had received little recognition until the Service used it as its
primary source for the position taken in Rev. Rul. 73-61. The case has been cited in on-
ly three previous tax cases, none of which had anything to do with interest-free loans.
See Estate of Inez G. Coleman, 52 T.C. 921, 926 (1969); Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C.
356, 364 (1968); and Geoffrey C. Davies, 40 T.C. 525, 531 (1963). The Commissioner
failed to prevail in all three cases where the litigation was concerned with a part-gift,
part-sale assertion of gift tax deficiency.
"Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
1979]
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gift tax is imposed on the value of the right to use money, normally
stated in terms of interest.s It held that a gift is made in each calen-
dar quarter in which a demand loan is outstanding, with the amount
of the gift being equal to the value of the use of the money for such
portion of the year as the funds are used by the borrower before repay-
ment. s"
Furthermore, the ruling notes as a practical matter that a taxable
gift will not arise in the case of most small interest-free loans because
of the availability of the annual exclusion."s
The ruling fails to indicate whether the amount of the gift
resulting from an interest-free demand loan is to be determined by
reference to the market rate of interest prevailing at the time of the
loan or by application of the tables in the regulations.5 8 In the case of
a demand loan, the ruling merely states, "The rate of interest that
would represent full and adequate consideration may vary, depend-
ing upon the actual circumstances pertaining to the transaction." 9
If, instead of employing the rates of interest as set out in the regula-
tions, the gift is valued according to market rates of interest on
arm's-length loans, there will be substantial uncertainty about the
ssld.
"Id. A parent borrowed $200,000 from a bank and later in the same month loaned
$250,000 to his son's wholly-owned corporation, receiving in return two non-interest
bearing notes. The first note was in the amount of $50,000, payable at the end of ten
years; the second was a demand note in the amount of $200,000. In the case of the term
loan, it was held that a gift equal to the value to the right to use the money for the term
of the loan had been made at the time the loan was granted.
sId. The ruling, however, fails to discuss the requirement of a "present interest"
contained in I.R.C. § 2503(b). Treas. Beg. § 25.2503-3(a) holds that a future interest is
one "limited to commence in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date of time."
Furthermore, subpart (b) of the same regulation says that "[ain unrestricted right to the
immediate use, possession or enjoyment of property or the income from property is a
present interest in the property." If the privilege of using someone else's money is
deemed property and subject to gift taxation, then an interest-free demand note should
surely qualify as a "present interest."
5 Although the method of determining the appropriate interest rate is not free from
doubt, it appears that the same rate should be employed for a demand loan's interest
and a term obligation's discount. See Rev. Rul. 73-61. In the case of a term loan, the
ruling states that the value of the "right to the use of the money loaned is ascertainable
by accepted actuarial methods, as of the date the money and the note were exchanged,
and is, therefore, subject to the gift tax at that time. See Section 25.2512-5 of the
regulations." The ruling made reference to Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 in ascertaining the
value of the right to use money loaned, which creates additional confusion since that
section contains the rate of 31/2 percent per annum for valuation of an interest trans-
ferred on or before December 31, 1970. It is unclear why the ruling refers to the old
rates instead of Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9, which contains the tables using a 6 percent per
annum rate for valuing transfers made after December 31, 1970. The reason may have
been that the loan involved was made prior to 1971.
"
9Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409. The Treasury announced a standard that
ranks second in nebulousness only to the reasonable prudent person standard of
negligence.
[Vol. 1:113
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amount of the gift. If judged by arm's-length standards, an unsecured
demand or term loan from lender to a related borrower might require
the use of a very substantial rate of interest. A standard unsecured
loan might require an interest rate in excess of eighteen percent.
6 0
Does a state usury law also come into play as a limit to the maximum
amount of interest to be imputed as a gift?
What about the income actually produced from the investment of
the interest-free loan? Should it be used as a gauge for valuation of
the imputed interest that is sought to be taxed as a gift? If the value of
the economic benefit received by the donee is emphasized, rather than
the value of what is transferred at the time of making the loan, a
number of fundamental principles of federal gift taxation will be
violated. For example, the regulations provide "[t]he gift tax is not im-
posed upon the receipt of property by the donee, nor is it necessarily
determined by the measure of enrichment resulting in the donee from
the transfer.... On the contrary, the tax ... is an excise tax upon [the]
act of making the transfer.., measured by the value of the property
passing from the donor . 6. ."I" The heralded case of Guggenhiem v.
Burnet2 also held that one must look to what the donor relinquishes,
rather than to what is received by the donee. This approach would
also have the disadvantage of leaving the transaction open as in
Burnet v. Logan.6 3 Besides being "open," an additional problem with
this suggestion is that it will add the burden of tracing the amount of
income arising from the loan proceeds. Also, the converse situation,
where the borrower was unsuccessful in being a Wall Street wizard,
should dictate no gift because of no income produced.
Finally, the employment of a flat rate of interest, as the ruling sug-
gests, also has its drawbacks. Even though this method is consistent
with the method of valuation of other interests requiring a rate of
return assumption, ' a degree of tax avoidance still can be achieved as
long as the interest rate for market investments remains in excess of
six percent per annum. 5
C. The Tax Court in Crown v. Commissioner
The Tax Court's position on the issue of interest-free demand loans
was made clear in Crown v. Commissioner," a 1977 decision. The
taxpayer was a member of a partnership that had made non-interest-
bearing demand loans to trusts for the benefit of members of the part-
'A standard revolving charge account, such as Visa or Mastercharge, afixes this
amount to the unpaid balance.
'Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1966).
82288 U.S. 280 (1933).
0283 U.S. 404 (1931).
"See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1966).
GsId.
667 T.C. 1060 (1977).
19791
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ners' families.81 The Commissioner, adhering to Revenue Ruling
73-61's precepts,8 8 determined that each of the interest-free loans
made by the partnership to the various trusts resulted in a gift equal to
the value of the use of the money.8" An average prime rate of 5.63
percent per annum was used to determine the amount of the gift.
70
The Tax Court disagreed with the Commissioner and elected to
follow Johnson v. United States,7 holding that there was no gift. The
court reflected on the primary concern of the Commissioner that the
ultimate estate would be diminished by anticipated amounts the
lender might have earned with the loaned funds if properly invested. 2
The court stated in response:
[O]ur income tax system does not recognize unrealized earnings or ac-
cumulations of wealth and no taxpayer is under any obligation to con-
tinuously invest his money for profit. The opportunity cost of either
letting one's money remain idle or suffering a loss from an unwise in-
vestment is not taxable merely because a profit could have been made
from a wise investment."
Continuing, the Tax Court said that "[t]he courts have uniformly
rejected every attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to subject the
making of non-interest-bearing loans to income or gift taxes.... If the
making of non-interest-bearing loans is to become a taxable event, we
think Congress, not the judiciary, should clearly say So. ' 1 The court
further recognized the danger in opening Pandora's Box by stating
that if the Commissioner's principle was established, there could be a
"multitude of situations involving gratuitous use or sharing of real or
personal property among relatives""5 that could fall within. The
mere use of dear old dad's home while he is in Europe for six months
may result in a gift tax if dad might have realized ten thousand
dollars by renting to complete strangers.
There are many reasons not to tax an interest-free demand loan to
a related borrower as a gift. As the court pointed out, there is no im-
7Id. at 1061. The amount in controversy was a very substantial $2,073,649 on the
demand notes and $15,956,375 on open account. The total imputed interest amounted
to a sum of $1,086,407.75.
"Id. The trusts were not required to pay any interest until the lender demanded
repayment. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
667 T.C. at 1062.
7 Id. at 1061. This apparently is the method the Commissioner will use to calculate
the gift arising from interest-free demand loans.
1254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
7267 T.C. at 1063.
"Id. at 1063-64.
"Id. at 1064.
"Id. at 1065. The Tax Court noted that the "application of the gift tax to common
intra-family sharing of use of property seems administratively unmanageable, and such
situations point up the difficulty with the concept of gift taxation attaching to more per-
missive use." Id.
[Vol. 1:113
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plied duty to reinvest money saved in a productive manner."6 A per-
son is privileged to hoard his excess capital behind the mantle of the
fireplace, or he may foolishly gamble it away in a French casino on
the Riviera. In either instance, the federal government has not
benefitted by an increase in the gross estate. That a lender would get
more satisfaction from making an interest-free demand loan to a child
than he would from squandering his excess money on consumable
assets, luxury items without a resale market, or junket trips to the
world's gambling halls should be no reason to slap an excise tax on
him. A lender still has all of the inherent risks that are involved in
any type of investment. He does not escape the possibility of losing all
by imprudent investments on the part of the related borrower. His
only reward is seeing a relative make it in the business world. Besides,
if the Commissioner has his way, why should not a guarantor for a
loan to a relative be treated as making a gift, at least to the extent of
difference in the interest rate charged with the guarantor's security
and the interest rate that would be charged by the local
neighborhood's loan shark, who has never heard of usury laws?
Perhaps these were some of the extremes that the Tax Court had in
mind when they concluded the opinion with Justice Holmes' axiom:
"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic." 7
IV. INCOME-TAX ANALYSIS OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS
A. Previous and Present Law
Revenue Ruling 73-6111 is concerned solely with the gift tax
aspects of interest-free loans between family members as were the
courts in Johnson v. United States79 and Crown v. Commissioner."0
However, it is possible that the Commissioner could try to impute in-
terest for income tax purposes under Section 482.81 Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Commissioner to distribute, ap-
portion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances
among two or more commonly owned or controlled entities if he
determines such action is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to
reflect income clearly. 2
"Id. at 1063-64.
"lId. at 1065 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
The Tax Court also noted the Service's failure to contest such transactions in the past.
7"1973-1 C.B. 408.
"254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
8067 T.C. 1060 (1977).
"I.R.C. § 482.
32Id. Reference may perhaps be made to Section 483, which was added to the in-
come tax provisions of the Code by the Revenue Act of 1964. That section attributes in-
terest to payments made under certain contracts for the sale or exchange of propery
when payment is deferred and interest is either unstated or fixed at an unreasonably low
rate. The problem with Section 483 analysis is that the section was designed to prevent
a specific evil-conversion of interest income into capital gains. See I.R.C. § 483(f)(3).
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A quick glance at the requirements of Section 482 shows that the
particular section was specifically intended for imputation of interest
among related entities and not related individuals. The three re-
quirements of Section 482 must be met:
(1) Two or more organizations, trades or businesses,
(2) Ownership or control directly or indirectly by the same in-
terests, and
(3) A finding by the Commissioner that it is necessary to allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances to prevent evasion of
taxes or to clearly reflect income.
8 3
For instance, do the above requirements apply to an intra-family
partnership that makes interest-free loans to trusts for the benefit of
other members of the family?" Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code may fail to apply because of the "control" requirement
necessary to constitute "ownership" of the two entities by the lender.8 "
The case law involving imputation of interest among related entities
through Section 482 has not been altogether consistent.8 '
The most prominent decision against the imputation of interest to
a lender of an interest-free demand note is the case of J. Simpson
Dean. 7 The taxpayers, husband and wife, received substantial loans
of money from their controlled corporation in exchange for interest-
free notes. The Commissioner unsuccessfully contended that the tax-
payers realized income to the extent of the economic benefit derived
from the use of the money that was borrowed without interest.8 8 The
Tax Court's decision rested on the recognition that if the taxpayers
61I.R.C. § 482. The problem encountered with Section 482 is that the courts have
considered its application to the area of interest-free loans among related individuals
and have rejected it. See, e.g., Saunders v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (D.
Hawaii 1968) (taxpayer held not to receive compensation when he was issued non-
interest-bearing loans) rev'd. on another issue, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971). See also
Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1974), which
relied in part on the Tax Court's reasoning in J. Simpson Dean, note 87 infra.
"Essentially the same fact situation was involved in Crown v. Commissioner, which
was litigated solely on the issue of gift taxation.
"sSee Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Related
Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 20TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx 463 (1962); Schlitke, Taxing as In-
come the Receipt of Interest-Free Loans, 33 U. CHI. L.R. 346 (1966).
"oThe cases concerning allocation of interest have reached three separate and
distinct results. The early cases deny the imputation of interest where the parties in-
tended that no interest be charged, and interest was neither accrued by the lender nor
deducted by the borrower. Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940). The second ap-
proach, which is the current position of the Tax Court, is that interest can be allocated
only where the borrowed funds generate income to the lender. Society Brand Clothes,
Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1952). Finally, the position of the Second Circuit is that interest
should be imputed in accordance with the Section 482 Regulations. B. Forman Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, cert. denied 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
'35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
"Id.
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had interest imputed to them, they would be entitled to a correspond-
ing Section 163 deduction, which would constitute a "wash." 8 Even
though this case has been heralded as a "Monday morning once-in-a-
lifetime happening," 0 the Tax Court, in its majority and dissenting
opinions in Crown v. Commissioner,"' still acknowledges the prece-
dent set therein. Surprisingly, the government did not appeal Dean,
and it waited twelve years to announce officially its nonacquies-
cence 9 2 Although Dean was concerned with a corporation making
interest-free loans to shareholders, the case is cited to illustrate the
utter confusion in the area.9
The Internal Revenue Service has not exactly been consistent in its
treatment of interest-free loans in the income tax area. Interest-free
loans and their effect on the gross income of both lenders and bor-
rowers have been the subjects of many tax rulings, often resulting in
different interpretations. For example, in a recent technical advice
memorandum, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that a lender who
makes an interest-free loan to an unrelated party does not recognize
any gross income.9 4 In ruling that no gross income is imputed to the
lender of an interest-free loan, the Commissioner followed the rule of
established case law." However, this ruling once again accentuates
the fact that lenders and borrowers of interest-free loans receive dif-
ferent treatment from the Internal Revenue Service. With the nonac-
quiescence in J. Simpson Dean,99 the Commissioner formally an-
nounced that gross income will be imputed to the borrower of an
interest-free loan.9 7
The recent technical advice memorandum" gave no justification
for the different treatment accorded lenders and borrowers, which
adds further confusion to utter chaos. It has long been the Commis-
SI.R.C. § 163. See J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083, 1091-92 (1961) (Bruce, J.,
dissenting), which correctly concludes that a Section 163 deduction is not automatic,
because of Section 265(2)'s prohibition on using the loan proceeds to purchase or carry
tax-exempt bonds.
"Lecture given by Professor Breeland to a L.L.M. class at the University of Florida
(winter quarter, 1977).
"67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
021973-2 C.B. 4.
"See O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. LAW REV. 1085, 1095
(1974).
"[19771 INT. REV. SERV. Letter Ruling (CCH) 7731007.
"Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C.
304 (1952); Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940). Moreover, a conflict with the
Dean rationale is found in a number of cases holding that a borrower has no interest
deduction on an interest-free loan. Loveman & Son Export Corp., 34 T.C. 776 (1960);
Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.C. 364 (1946); Rainbow Gasoline Corp., 31 B.T.A. 1050
(1935).
"-35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
9'1973-2 C.B. 4.
"Note 94, supra.
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sioner's position that gross income is imputed to the borrower of an
interest-free loan. Presumably, the Commissioner will continue to
assert that interest-free loans to employees or stockholders are
analagous to the rent-free use of corporate property. However, the
Commissioner, in ruling no income is imputed to the lender, reasoned
that the right to receive income never came into existence because the
parties never intended to create a liability. Furthermore, when the
borrower is an unrelated party instead of an employee or stockholder,
the interest income that would be imputed under the Commissioner's
position would most likely in any event be deductible under Section
163. " This assumes, of course, the interest deduction is not barred by
an exception such as Section 265(2)'s prohibition on using the loan
proceeds to purchase tax-exempt bonds. 00
The present law and the Internal Revenue Service's position
thereon raise many questions about the different treatment accorded
lenders, related borrowers, and unrelated borrowers of interest-free
loans. Perhaps the Internal Revenue Service should revert to simple
basics, such as Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,101
which is the primary vehicle for taxing economic benefits. Between
unrelated individuals in an arm's-length transaction, it is readily ap-
parent that the borrower could be deemed to have recognized income
from an interest-free loan. The income tax analysis of a gift would
not apply since the prerequisite "detached and disinterested gener-
osity" is not usually present.'2 However, as to interest-free loans be-
tween family members, the question arises whether there was an
arm's-length transaction. For gift tax purposes, the showing that the
loan is repaid or that it is secured may help to negate the implication
of a true gift; on the other hand, income tax may be assessed on the
borrower to the extent of economic benefit derived.0 3
Crown's majority may have found the key in saying that "there
are policy considerations which militate against viewing the value use
of money or property as a taxable event . 1. 04 (Emphasis added). A
recent example of what the court may have had in mind appeared in
"I.R.C. § 163.
' **ee note 89, supra.
' *"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived .... " I.R.C. § 61(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1954)
asserts that gross income includes "'income realized in any form, whether in money,
property, or services." The courts have recognized that Congress intended a very broad
interpretation of "gross income." See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956). See also Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1951) (rent-free use of
a corporation's house); Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1245, 1252 (1960) (per-
sonal use of a corporation's automobile).
"I.R.C. § 102(a).
"'I.R.C. § 102(b).
1'467 T.C. 1060, 1065 (1977).
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the Wall Street Journal, under the title "Is $20 Billion Hidden from
the Tax Collector?:"
Using its data on compliance, the IRS estimated that a total $1.8
billion in dividends and interest wasn't reported in 1973 (Commerce
Department's estimate for the same period was closer to $20 billion).
Whichever estimate is closer to the true amount, a lot of money may be
involved. But the Treasury doesn't want to beef up enforcement. It
fears that could "generate taxpayer resentment so great as to . . .
jeopardize the very foundation of the entire system of voluntary com-
pliance," a Treasury official recently warned Congress .
B. Assignment of Income Doctrine
While the income produced by borrowed funds is normally taxed
to the borrower, it is arguable that the income arising from an
interest-free loan should be taxed to the lender through the applica-
tion of the assignment of income doctrine. 0
The doctrine may be illustrated by analogy to a tree and its fruit:
The owner of the tree picks some fruit and gives it to another who con-
verts it to cash. As the owner has kept the tree that produces the fruit,
the tree's produce . . . remains his for tax purposes, even though
economically it has become the property of another....
If the owner gives away the tree.... the donee in general is taxable
on fruit subsequently produced.. ., because he has become the owner
of the income-producing property itself. . . . In many instances,
however, it is difficult to say what should be regarded as fruit. Mere
appreciation in the value of property (the tree) is not fruit until it is
realized .... 10'
But, unlike the classical Horst v. Helveringl°8 decision, the same in-
come tax problem is not confronted. With an interest-free loan, the
income interest has not yet matured when the initial transaction oc-
curs.
For example, if a father made an interest-free loan to his son of
$100,000 which was outstanding for a year, and if we assume a sim-
ple interest rate of 6 per cent per annum, the father, at first glance, ap-
pears to be escaping income taxes on $6,000 by the fruit-tree analogy.
However, if the father had charged a reasonable interest rate to the
son for the use of his money, he would have realized gross income of
that amount while the son would have gotten a corresponding deduc-
tion.' °0 There are many difficulties with the application of the doc-
'
0 Jacobs, Tax Report, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1978, at 1, Col. 5. (March 22, 1978).
'*8FREELAND, LIND, & STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 265
(2d ed. 1977).
'"'Id. at 288.
108311 U.S. 112 (1940).
'*.R.C. §§ 61(a), 163 (assuming § 265 is not applicable).
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trine. Should the market rate for interest be imputed to the father, or
should the actual income earned off the principal loaned be con-
sidered the fruit?"'
The greatest difficulty appears because of the differences in a gift
for gift tax purposes and one for income tax purposes."' Failure to
tax the lender on income produced by an interest-free loan might
result in that income's escaping taxation altogether. If the income
produced by the loan is treated as a gift, the borrower may contend
that it is therefore excludable from his own income. Unless the in-
come is then taxed to the lender on assignment of income principles, it
may not be subjected to income taxation at all.
Now it is easy to realize the predicament that the Internal Revenue
Service is in. The income-shifting potential of interest-free loans has
not been attacked by the Internal Revenue Service, and it is doubtful
that there is existing doctrine sufficient to meet the threat." 12 Perhaps
there is not so great a threat of attack by the Internal Revenue Service,
since a person is still under no duty to reinvest his savings if he chooses
to forego the opportunity to increase his net worth. A lender can
always escape income taxation by investing the principal in tax-free
bonds, as provided by Section 103."1 A lender would then enjoy tax-
free dollars to spend without the apparent risk or hassle involved in
making an interest-free loan, especially if it is to a relative.
C. Short-Term and Grantor Trust's Implications
The issue of income taxation of interest-free loans may be more
readily understood by reference to Code provisions charging the
grantor with income of short term and revocable trusts. I' These pro-
visions are designed to prevent the use of the trust device to transfer
the income potential of a grantor's capital except where the grantor
also passes an interest in the corpus sufficient to justify separate in-
come treatment to the beneficiary. The principle of making interest-
free loans-especially if they are demand notes-suggests that a tax-
payer can successfully split income with members of his family by
surrendering only the immediate possession of his money.
The problem is that interest-free loans, payable on demand or in
the form of short-term notes, are not embraced by the grantor trust
"'What if the son invested in tax-exempt bonds?
"Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), held that the question whether
a transfer of money or property constitutes a gift within the exclusion of Section 102(a)
of the Code is an issue of fact on whether there was the prerequisite donative intent. A
gift for Section 2501 's excise tax, on the other hand, is based on property passing for less
than adequate consideration in dollars or dollars worth. See I.R.C. § 2512(b).
"'See discussion of §§ 482,483 at note 81, supra. 25 J. Tax. 358 (1966) recognizes
the issue and suggests that it belongs to the field of imputed income.
"
3 I.R.C. § 103.
"4.R.C. §§ 673(a), 676(a).
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provisions of the Code: "Part 1 [of Subchapter J] has no application to
any organization which is not to be classified for tax purposes as a
trust under the classification rules of Section 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3,
and 301.7701-4 ... ,."s
Generally speaking, an arrangement will be treated as a trust under
the Internal Revenue Code if it can be shown that the purpose of the
arrangement is to vest in trustees responsibility for the protection and
conservation of property for beneficiaries who cannot share in the
discharge of this responsibility and, therefore, are not associates in a
joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit." 8
There is case law that seems to be a little more on point in this area
than the regulations. In Corliss v. Bowers,"7 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to treat the grantor of a
revocable trust as the owner of the corpus and to tax him on the in-
come of the trust. Merely on the basis of general income tax prin-
ciples, the High Court, in Helvering v. Clifford,"8 held that a grantor
who had created a trust for a five-year term for the benefit of his wife
was taxable on the income: because of the retained power, he was still
the substantial owner. These cases and others seem to be consistent
with taxing the lender on the income produced from the principal of
an interest-free loan. However, once again the theory runs aground
on the fact that the lender has the right not to invest his property if he
sees fit. There seems to be a slender line separating the fruit-tree doc-
trine and grantor trusts on the one hand and interest-free loans on the
other.
There seems to be an even clearer line where a lender lends to a
borrower-especially a trust or relative-an interest-free loan, but re-
tains a security interest in the property purchased with the loan. Even
going one step further, a security agreement might be found where the
loan of the interest-free dollars is conditioned on a particular use of
the funds, such as investment in certain low-risk securities. An
interest-free loan that might escape income taxation to the lender
would seem to have all of the benefits and none of the drawbacks of a
short-term trust under the Internal Revenue Code. The lender can re-
tain essentially the same interest-or perhaps even a greater in-
terest-in the funds as the grantor of a short-term trust who has a
reversionary interest which will take effect in less than ten years. The
grantor will continue to be subject to income tax on the trust
income,I" however, while the lender will escape income taxation. The
possibilities will be readily perceived by the tax planner.
"
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.64 1(a)-0(a) (1954).
"'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1954). By this definition, Section 482 or a similarly
enacted statute may be the way to impute interest.
"7281 U.S. 376 (1930).
"'309 U.S. 331 (1940).
"'I.R.C. § 673(a).
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V. THE DOWNSIDE RISK INVOLVED IN
UTILIZING INTEREST-FREE LOANS
A. In General
In our society, where capital is a money-making tool, an essential
resource, and an absolute necessity in order for an entrepreneur's vi-
sion to materialize into reality, the individual still has the final say on
the type of risk he is willing to accept for investment of his excess
capital. Even though he can invest his savings of $500,000 safely at
six percent interest and earn $30,000 of income per year through a
savings account, he may permit the principal to sit idly in a non-
interest-paying checking account or other nonproductive investment
without having income imputed to him. But if he lends the $500,000
to his child without charging interest, and the child turns around and
puts the principal in a savings bank to earn $30,000 per year, he
might be said to have made a gift of that amount, which will be sub-
ject to a gift tax. He may also find that the income assigned or im-
puted to him for income tax purposes." 0
In order to calculate the risk involved if the tax planning goes
astray and the Commissioner has his way, we will assume that T,
typical taxpayer, has $500,000 of excess funds lying about. The
prime rate for interest is six percent per annum for the period of the
hypothetical. 12'
B. Gift Taxation of an Interest-Free Demand Loan
Without exceeding the scope of the article, that is, interest-free de-
mand loans, it is worthwhile to note the distinction between interest-
free demand and term loans and the tax consequences of each. In the
case of a term loan, the promise to repay becomes enforceable only at
some time in the future. In contrast, the promise to repay a demand
loan is presently enforceable by the lender. The present value of the
reversionary interest in the loan proceeds that the lender retains by
way of the borrower's promise to repay, in the case of an interest-free
term loan, is worth less than the amount of the loan. The difference in
present value and future interest is determined by an appropriate dis-
count factor, which is presumably the same as the rate of interest that
'
2 Since this is a downside risk problem, we must assume both will happen to the
donor. With the donee or borrower, he should be able to escape income taxation either
by the § 102(a) gift exclusion or a wash via a § 162 interest deduction. The latter and
ZBA implications will be discussed infra.
"I"For purposes of the worst-case analysis, an average prime rate of six percent will
be used. Keep in mind, however, the method of valuation for interest-free loans is as
uncertain as the taxability itself. See discussion at note 58, supra. Another problem
with valuation can be perceived, which may further complicate matters: what happens
when the so-called prime rate is a mere six percent at the time of the transaction but
jumps up to, say, eight percent at the end of the year? For this reason, we are assuming
an average prime rate to avoid additional computational knuckle drill.
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would be imputed on an interest-free demand loan under our assump-
tion.
For example, if T makes a loan of $500,000 to his son, repayable
at the end of ten years, the present value of the son's promise to repay,
discounted at 5ix percent, is $270,197.50.22 At the time the loan is
made, the value of the loan proceeds transferred from T to his son ex-
ceeds the value of the son's promise to repay by $220,802.50. Since a
man who deals at arm's length with another is not expected to forego
such an amount in a real business context, a gift is deemed to have
been made at the time of the initial transfer.
On the other hand, a demand loan has the advantage of being
presently repayable immediately upon request of the lender.
Therefore, the present value of the obligation to repay is deemed to be
equal to the value of the money lent. One may go one step further
with this line of thought and assert that since the promise to repay and
the present value of what was transferred, i.e., principal of the loan,
are equal, then no gift in reality has occurred.
An illustration that differentiates the treatment of the loans shows
the economic infeasibility of using an interest-free term, versus de-
mand, obligation. Recall that the Commissioner would assert that a
gift of $220,802.50 was made on the initial transfer of an interest-free
term loan of $500,000 for ten years.121 On the same $500,000,
Revenue Ruling 73-61 124 and the Commissioner's position in Crown'
would hold that there has been a gift only of the imputed interest for
each calendar quarter the loan proceeds are outstanding. Using six
percent per annum for uniformity, there would be deemed to have
been a $30,000 gift for each year the loan is outstanding. That means
a difference in tax treatment in the initial year of almost $200,000. In
addition, Revenue Ruling 73-61 126 points to the fact that most interest-
free demand loans will escape the gift tax altogether because of the
Section 2503(b) 27 annual $3,000 exclusion which would be ap-
plicable. That means the demand note would afford a tax savings of
an additional $30,000 over ten years, while the term loan would be
entitled to only $3,000 exclusion in the year of the transfer. The bot-
tom line is that the term loan would generate a total taxable gift of
$217,802.50, while the demand note would generate a taxable gift of
'See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1966).
'"See note 56, supra. The Commissioner utilized this method in regard to a term
loan which was made interest-free.
' 1973-1 C.B. 408.
'See note 70, supra. The Commissioner ascertained that the interest rate to be im-
puted was the average prime rate of 5.63 percent per annum. The actual method of
computation used to arrive at this figure was not alluded to in the court's opinion.
21973-1 C.B. 408.
"
2l.R.C. § 2503(b). The hypothetical will assume that the § 2513 election, which
can raise the annual exclusion to $6,000, is not utilized.
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$27,000. There is a difference in total tax due over the period of ten
years, but the present value of cash-in-hand should make up the dif-
ference. It will not be difficult for the tax planner to see the preferable
route if the Commissioner's position is taken.
Perhaps this explains the mystique of the interest-free demand loan
vis-a-vis the term obligation. If the two types of interest-free loans are
differentiated in this way, a lender would be foolish to make a term
obligation interest free. Besides having to muster the entire amount of
gift tax liability on the initial transfer for an interest-free term loan,
the lender loses the flexibility and control of the asset itself for the
term proceeds are outstanding.
The bottom line is that this still may be a relatively inexpensive
way to, in effect, give a child an income interest which will be similar
to a trust, without the legal hassle and payment of trust management
fees. Especially will this be true if the demand loan is secured by
assets capable of appreciation, such as stocks. The lender's taxable
gift will be fixed (subject to changes in the interest rate on which the
computation is based), while the borrower will enjoy any apprecia-
tion in the value of the investments made with the loan proceeds.
C. Income Taxation of an Interest-free Demand Obligation
The income taxation of interest-free demand loans between related
individuals may be baffling, to say the least. There are possible in-
come tax implications to either the borrower or the lender in such
situations.
First of all, the borrower, since he is related to the lender, should
not be considered to have received compensation for services by the
use of an interest-free loan. The imputed interest that he should have
paid should be considered a gift via Section 102(a). If the actual in-
come produced by an interest-free loan is considered a gift, the bor-
rower may raise this contention against the imposition of an income
tax.
However, since we are considering worst-possible-nightmare
analysis, we must assume that the borrower, child of the lender, will
be taxed on the market value of the use of the funds. The Commis-
sioner can make an argument that there is no detached and
disinterested generosity involved since there is a mere loan versus
outright gift of the proceeds, especially if the note is secured by a com-
plex loan arrangement. The big problem here, making this the worse
possible situation, is that double taxation can result. The borrower
will pay one tax on the potential income represented by the market
value for use of the funds, and he will be taxed additionally on the in-
come actually produced.
To illustrate, using our hypothetical, the borrower would have im-
puted to him an income of $30,000 per annum, the value (at six per-
cent) of the money lent; he will also be taxed on the amount of income
produced, which should equal or exceed the going interest rate if the
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money is merely placed in a savings account. The borrower could
thus be taxed to the tune of a conservative $60,000 per annum. The
lender may be liable for income tax upon the making of an interest-
free loan. He would have imputed income from forbearance of the in-
terest that he could have made by a comparable arm's-length transac-
tion. For purposes of this analysis, we will still assume six percent,
but a planner should realize that the market value could be found to
be much greater for a poor credit risk. 128 In fact, if market value is
the standard applied, the only limit upon the amount of interest
which may be imputed would be a state's usury law, which may have
no bearing on this federal question. The lender, if a six percent rate is
applied, would recognize gross income of $30,000 per year from the
interest-free loan.
Since the use of a flat rate may still effect a reduction of gross in-
come if the loan proceeds produce a return greater than six percent,
the Commissioner would, by the worst-case theory, assert there has
been an assignment of income: that is, that the income to be imputed
to the lender is equal to the economic benefit derived by the borrower
from the free use of the money, as measured by what was actually
gained by its use. Under this analysis, rather than making an interest-
free loan, the lender would be viewed as purchasing assets for the use
or benefit of the borrower. The fruit is given to the borrower but the
tree is retained. 2 9 Hence, the lender would be taxed to the extent of
the income produced, but the borrower would be deemed to have
received a gift of the fruit.
The income tax ramifications are complex to say the least,
especially when taxation in one direction merely opens a loophole in
the other.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are conflicts in the taxation of interest-free loans. Demand
loans have been successful in escaping gift taxation. The mere fact
that they are non-interest bearing appears not to be a factor calling
for realization of gross income.
The biggest problem confronted in both areas is the Internal
Revenue Service's worry that a person is not investing his savings ap-
propriately in order to realize more income, and thereby increase his
gross estate. Until Congress makes it a duty to invest-a doubtful
eventuality-the area of interest-free loans may remain quite mud-
dled. Perhaps it would be better for the Service and Congress to take
a deep, thorough look at what is truly involved. The taxation of
interest-free loans may lead to the possible imputation of income from
"'See text, note 57-59.
"'See text, note 105-107.
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many sources, such as the use of one's own home, services rendered by
a housewife, services performed by the taxpayer for his own benefit,
etc.
Of course, as far as the gift-tax area is concerned, the taxpayer is
not decreasing his gross estate by making a non-profit transaction
with one of his relatives. If he dies, the same amount loaned will still
be included in the estate's taxable base. Likewise, in the income-tax
area, the amount of income earned on the principal of the loan will
still be taxed as gross income if the investment was not in tax-exempt
bonds; it is just a matter of who the taxpayer will be-borrower or
lender. It is possible that the whole matter of interest-free loans falls
into that category of things which a government must tolerate in a
free enterprise system such as ours.
Only the future will answer most of the questions raised in this ar-
ticle. Congress may ultimately set the height of the pole for this par-
ticular limbo contest. For now, however, the taxpayer must look to
the court system for the rules on how low he can go.
